Bad Corporate Marriages: Waking Up in Bed the Morning After by Cai, Ye & Shefrin, Hersh
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Finance Leavey School of Business
6-9-2015
Bad Corporate Marriages: Waking Up in Bed the
Morning After
Ye Cai
Santa Clara University, ycai@scu.edu
Hersh Shefrin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/finance
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This is a working paper.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Leavey School of Business at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Finance by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cai, Ye and Shefrin, Hersh, "Bad Corporate Marriages: Waking Up in Bed the Morning After" (2015). Finance. Paper 1.
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/finance/1
  
Bad Corporate Marriages: 
Waking Up in Bed the Morning After 
 
 
Ye Cai and Hersh Shefrin 
 
Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA 95053 
 
December 2013 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines corporate risk taking behavior in the wake of unsuccessful merger activities. 
We find that relative to other firms, firms that made bad acquisitions take both more systematic 
risk and more idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, higher risk is associated with greater value 
destruction and stronger corporate governance. The increased risk can be traced to increased cash 
flow volatility, increased leverage, decreased asset liquidity, more investment in R&D, and more 
equity-based executive compensation. These findings are in line with the behavioral approach 
suggesting that in the domain of losses, decision makers generally become more tolerant of risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Proponents of behavioral finance emphasize that risk appetite is not time invariant, but 
instead varies by circumstance, both for individuals and for organizations. In particular, prior 
studies find that when people perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, or below 
aspiration, they are more prone to take risk than otherwise, even to the point of becoming risk 
seeking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lopes, 1987; March and Shapira, 1987; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). The propensity to take greater risk in adverse circumstances is related to the 
phenomenon “escalation of commitment” (Staw, 1981), which leads managers of losing projects 
to throw good money after bad. For investors, the behavioral response to losers is discussed as 
part of the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). 
In this paper, we examine an important corporate event, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
and investigate the degree to which corporate risk taking is higher for acquiring firms that 
experienced unsuccessful merger activities than for other firms. We focus on M&A for two 
important reasons. First, M&A are among the largest and most visible forms of corporate 
investment that have a significant valuation impact on shareholder wealth. For example, in the 
year 2012, 37,923 M&A deals were announced worldwide totaling $2.6 trillion (Thomson 
Reuters, 2012). As we demonstrate, these M&A deals significantly alter managerial perspectives 
on risk taking. Second, announcement returns surrounding M&A transactions provide a good 
proxy for whether managers view themselves as being in the domain of gains or the domain of 
losses. Unlike annual or quarterly stock returns which for many reasons lie outside the control of 
managers, the short-window announcement return of an acquisition signals the market’s 
immediate assessment of the quality of the managerial decision. A positive (negative) reaction by 
the market will place managers psychologically into the domain of gains (losses).  
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We find evidence to support our main hypothesis that acquiring firms that made bad 
acquisitions take on more risk than counterpart firms. The counterpart firms comprise acquirers 
engaged in either general acquisitions or good acquisitions and firms that did not make 
acquisitions. We follow the prior literature (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Cassell et al., 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2012) and base our measure of firm risk on the volatility of daily stock returns. 
We evaluate the success of an acquisition deal by applying the event study methodology 
developed by Brown and Warner (1985), and define an acquisition to be unsuccessful if the 
three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement is less than or equal to -3%. 
We find that an acquiring firm’s stock return volatility increases significantly following an 
unsuccessful acquisition: Engaging in a bad acquisition is associated with a 13.7% increase in 
the variance of daily stock returns in the next fiscal year. When we decompose total risk into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find that relative to their counterparts, acquiring 
firms that experienced bad acquisitions take on both more systematic risk and more idiosyncratic 
risk. Furthermore, in line with March and Shapira (1987), we find that the more negative the 
merger outcome, as perceived by managers, the more risk firms subsequently bear. 
External and internal governance disciplines managers who make value-destroying 
acquisitions (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Stronger external and internal 
monitoring might exert more pressure on CEOs who make bad acquisitions, and exacerbate their 
tendency to seek risk. In addition, studies of group polarization in behavioral psychology suggest 
that groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme than the initial inclination of their 
members (Isenberg, 1986). Therefore, we predict that among acquiring firms that made bad 
acquisitions, those with stronger external and internal governance take more risk after the 
acquisition announcement than those with weaker external and internal governance. Consistent 
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with this prediction, we find that for acquirers that experienced bad acquisitions, the presence of 
a blockholder is associated with higher return volatility. A similar statement holds, when there is 
broader analyst coverage, when the CEO is younger and has shorter tenure, and when the 
acquiring firm has put fewer antitakeover provisions in place.  
A typical concern for empirical corporate finance research is the issue of endogeneity, 
meaning that some omitted variables drive the observed findings. Our study is no exception. 
Although we have controlled for firm fixed effects in our model specifications, it remains 
possible that some time-varying firm characteristics, uncontrolled for in our regressions, are 
correlated with both the incidence of unsuccessful acquisitions and the increased firm risk. We 
further control for potential omitted variables such as CEO overconfidence and executive 
compensation incentives, and continue to find evidence supporting the notion that firm risk 
increases after unsuccessful acquisitions.  
We consider several alternative reasons for our findings, such as  
 increased risk generally follows any type of acquisition;  
 increased risk after bad acquisitions stems mainly from risk differences in target 
firms; and  
 increased risk occurs largely because of debt-equity risk shifting.  
We find that none of these alternatives explain away our main finding that acquiring firms 
associated with bad acquisitions take on more risk than their counterparts.  
We investigate potential channels through which firms can increase their risk profiles. 
These channels include the adoption of both more aggressive financial policies and riskier 
investment projects. We find that the risk profiles of firms experiencing unsuccessful 
acquisitions are reflected in their cash flows, not just their stock returns. We find consistent 
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evidence that these profiles feature both greater financial risk and greater investment risk, as 
reflected in higher financial leverage, lower asset liquidity, and greater investment in R&D. In 
addition, we also find that the compensation structure for acquiring firm CEOs associated with 
bad mergers tilts more towards equity-based pay.  
The behavioral literature on M&A activities began with Roll’s hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986). Roll argues that overconfidence, or hubris, explains why acquiring firms tend to suffer 
from the winner’s curse, in the sense of overpaying for their targets.  Subsequently, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) develop two metrics for measuring CEO overconfidence, and provide evidence 
that overconfident CEOs complete more mergers than their less confident counterparts, 
especially diversifying mergers. They also find that overconfident CEOs of the least equity 
dependent firms are more apt to engage in acquisitions, perhaps because they are least concerned 
about financing the acquisition with equity they believe to be underpriced.  
Shefrin (2007) suggests that other behavioral phenomena, besides overconfidence, 
explain aspects of the winner’s curse. In line with the main issue discussed within this paper, he 
describes several case studies in which acquirers with a history of underperformance make high 
risk, value destructive bets in their choice of targets. 
The preceding studies tend to focus on value destructive decisions by managers in an 
efficient market environment. Notably, another strand of the behavioral literature on M&A 
focuses on the role of mispricing. In this respect, managers might use M&A to cater to investor 
sentiment, perhaps by using the overvalued stock of their own firms to acquire less overvalued 
targets, or by engaging in a combination for which sentiment is positive (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). This theory offers some insight into why cash acquirers subsequently outperform stock 
6 
 
 
acquirers who earn negative long-run returns (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998).  
The approach in this paper focuses mostly on the risk and value characteristics of 
acquiring firm managers, and less on issues pertaining to sentiment. In this regard, our working 
hypothesis is that markets efficiently price both targets and acquirers, although we do discuss the 
implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 5. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We develop hypotheses in Section 2. In 
Section 3 we describe our sample and variable construction. In Section 4, we test the hypotheses 
and present empirical results. In Section 5, we discuss caveats, and we provide concluding 
remarks in Section 6. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
When a publicly traded acquiring firm announces a proposed acquisition, the market 
reaction can vary from positive to negative. It seems reasonable to suggest that the firm’s 
managers will view a positive reaction by the market as confirming evidence of their good 
judgment, thereby placing them, psychologically, into the domain of gains. On the other hand, a 
negative reaction by the market will place them, psychologically, into the domain of losses. The 
question we address in this paper is how the risk profiles of acquiring firms that experienced bad 
acquisitions differ from their counterparts, subsequent to observing the market’s reaction to the 
acquisition announcement.  
The psychological literature suggests that people who perceive themselves to be in the 
domain of losses are more prone to take risk than otherwise (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Lopes, 1987; March and Shapira, 1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Therefore, all else being 
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the same,
1
 negative reactions by the market to acquisition announcements lead executives, and 
perhaps board members, to make corporate decisions that increase the risk profiles of their firms. 
Following prior studies (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Cassell et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 
2012), we measure firm risk using the variance of its stock returns, as a firm’s risk profile will 
get reflected in the volatility of its stock. This discussion leads to our first hypothesis, which we 
state as follows: 
H1a: Relative to the stocks of counterparts, the stocks of acquiring firms that have made 
bad acquisitions exhibit higher return volatility after the announcement of the acquisition deal. 
H1b: Relative to its own stock before the announcement of the acquisition deal, the stocks 
of acquiring firms that have made bad acquisitions exhibit higher return volatility after the 
announcement.   
Managers could face serious market penalties following destructive acquisitions. For 
example, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that firms which engage in value-decreasing takeovers 
tend to become takeover targets themselves, and Lehn and Zhao (2006) suggest that CEOs who 
make poor acquisition decisions are more likely to get fired. They conclude that internal 
governance, takeovers, and bankruptcies discipline managers who make value-destroying 
acquisitions. Therefore, stronger external and internal monitoring might put more pressure on 
CEOs who make bad acquisitions, and amplify their already shifted appetite for risk due to poor 
acquisition outcomes. In addition, studies on group polarization in behavioral psychology 
suggest that groups tend to arrive at decisions about risk exposure that are more extreme than the 
initial inclination of its members (Isenberg, 1986). These considerations lead us to expect that 
among acquiring firms that made bad acquisitions, those with stronger external and/or internal 
                                                          
1
 Of course, all else might not be the same. For example, we also recognize that executives’ incentives might change 
as a result of a merger not being positive, a point we discuss later in the paper. 
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governance will feature higher risk. Our prediction of the governance effect on the amplified risk 
attitude is summarized in the following hypothesis:  
H2: Among acquiring firms that have made bad acquisitions, stock return volatility is 
more pronounced in the presence of stronger external/internal monitoring. 
March and Shapira (1987) propose a theory in which firms’ risk taking increases with the 
magnitude of subpar performance, meaning performance below some reference target. In line 
with March and Shapira (1987), we expect that the more negative the merger outcome, the more 
risk firms subsequently bear. This leads to our third hypothesis, which we state as follows: 
H3: Among acquiring firms that have made bad acquisitions, there is a negative 
relationship between the announcement return and the risk choices of the firm, including the 
reflection of a firm’s risk profile in the volatility of its stock return.  
We expect that that increased stock return volatility for a firm’s stock reflects investors’ 
aggregate beliefs about the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows. Managers who seek to increase the 
volatility of future firm performance are likely to prefer riskier investment and financial policies. 
For example, CEOs might adopt more aggressive financial policies and increase their risk 
exposures by taking on more debt and/or by holding less liquid assets. Meanwhile, CEOs can 
increase the riskiness of their firms by investing in riskier investment projects. Compared to 
other investment vehicles, R&D expenditures tend to be riskier given the high degree of 
uncertainty related to their future payoffs (Coles et al., 2006). Therefore, we expect that firms 
that have made bad acquisitions will have higher leverage, lower asset liquidity, and more 
investment in R&D. Our predictions of a firm’s financial and investment risk profile, after a bad 
acquisition, are summarized in the following three sub-hypotheses: 
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H4a: Relative to counterparts, cash flow volatility is higher for firms that have made bad 
acquisitions.  
H4b: Relative to counterparts, firm leverage is higher and asset liquidity is lower for 
firms that have made bad acquisitions.. 
H4c: Relative to counterparts, R&D investment is higher for firms that have made bad 
acquisitions. 
In addition, executive compensation structure might also be related to whether the firm 
has made a bad acquisition. Due to their increased risk tolerance in the domain of (psychological) 
losses, boards of directors might prefer more equity-based compensation contracts to motivate 
CEOs to take higher levels of risk. Some CEOs of firms that have made bad acquisitions might 
effectively determine their own pay structure and prefer riskier compensation packages. 
Therefore, in firms that have made bad acquisitions, we expect CEO compensation to tilt towards 
more equity-based pay.  This discussion leads to our fifth hypothesis, which we state as follows: 
H5: For firms that have made bad acquisitions, CEO compensation is more equity-based 
than in counterpart firms.  
 
3. Variable construction and sample selection 
3.1. Measurement of bad acquisition 
 We obtain a sample of completed acquisitions from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. We follow the prior literature and exclude small deals 
which have a deal value lower than $5 million, and lower than 5% of the acquirer’s market 
capitalization prior to the announcement date. For each firm-year observation in our sample, we 
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examine whether the firm has made any acquisitions in that fiscal year which could have a 
significant negative impact on the firm value.  
To measure the effect of an acquisition on the value of an acquiring firm, we obtain 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the standard event study method developed by 
Brown and Warner (1985). We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return and 
estimate the market model parameters over the 200 trading days ending two months before the 
merger announcement. Our choice of the estimation period is motivated by Schwert (1996) who 
finds that on average, target firm stock price starts to rise about two months before the initial bid 
announcement. Hence, our estimation procedure is likely to minimize potential bias in 
announcement returns due to investor anticipation or information leakage before the deal 
announcement. We calculate three-day CARs over the event window (-1, +1) where the event 
day 0 is the acquisition announcement date.  
We define an indicator variable Bad acquisition as one if the firm has engaged in an 
acquisition in fiscal year t which has a three-day CAR less than or equal to -3%, and zero 
otherwise. We choose this -3% as the cutoff point because a three percent abnormal drop in 
shareholder wealth is significant: for an average firm in our sample with $2.2 billion market 
capitalization, shareholders lose $66 million around the deal announcement.
2
  
 
3.2. Measurement of future stock return volatility 
 Following the prior literature (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Cassell et al., 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2012), our main measure of firm risk is based on the volatility of future stock 
returns. High risk projects will increase the volatility of firm’s future cash flows, which in turn 
                                                          
2
 Our findings are robustness if we use alternative cutoff values such as -2% or -4%.  
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will make firm’s stock returns more volatile. We calculate total risk (TotRisk) as the annualized 
variance of daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1. 
 Stock returns could be driven by market fluctuations as well as firm specific risk factors. 
To control for market fluctuations, we follow the standard procedure of decomposing total risk 
into two parts: systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. To estimate the market model, we use daily 
stock return data 36 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year t+1 with CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio as our proxy for the market portfolio. Using the estimated parameters, 
we construct daily expected stock returns as well as daily residual returns in fiscal year t+1. 
Systematic risk (SysRisk) is measured as the annualized variance of these expected daily stock 
returns, and idiosyncratic risk (IdioRisk) is measured as the annualized variance of the residual 
daily stock returns. Consistent with the prior literature (Core and Guay, 1999; Xu and Malkiel, 
2003), we take the natural logarithm of all three risk measures to mitigate the concern that our 
inferences might be affected by the skewness in the distribution of these risk measures. All risk 
measures are calculated with at least 60 days of stock returns data. For robustness, we also 
construct these risk measures using daily stock return data over the fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 
3.3. Measurement of future cash flow volatility 
 An alternative proxy for firm risk is the volatility of future cash flows. Estimating firm 
risk using yearly cash flow volatility is problematic as most firms do not have long enough time-
series cash flow data (Shin and Stulz, 2000). To address this feature of the data, we use quarterly 
Compustat data, and calculate quarterly earnings as the sum of net income before extraordinary 
items (IBQ), income taxes (TXTQ), and interest and related expense (XINTQ). Cash flow 
volatility (CFVol) is calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings in the next fiscal 
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year. For robustness, we also calculate cash flow volatility using quarterly earnings data in the 
three fiscal years from t+1 to t+3.
3
  
 
3.4. Measurement of future financial and investment risk 
 Managers have two primary means of increasing firm risk: They can invest in riskier 
investment projects, or they can take on larger financial risk. To distinguish between investment 
and financial risk, we construct several proxies. We measure the riskiness of a firm’s investment 
policies by the R&D expenditures variable R&D/Sales, which is defined as the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total sales measured in fiscal year t+1. Compared to other investments, R&D 
expenditures tend to be riskier given the high degree of uncertainty related to their future payoffs 
(Coles et al., 2006).  
 To capture the riskiness of firm financial policies, we follow Cassell et al. (2012) and 
examine firms’ capital structures and the liquidity of their assets. Our first measure of financial 
risk is based on the debt burden in firms’ capital structures, as more levered firms are associated 
with higher financial risk. We define Lev as the ratio of total debt to total assets in the fiscal year 
t+1. We also examine asset liquidity of a company, as firms that hold more liquid assets are 
perceived to have a lower level of financial risk. We measure AssetLiq as the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities in fiscal year t+1, scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the period.   
                                                          
3
 We acknowledge that even with quarterly earnings data, we still have very limited time-series quarterly earnings to 
estimate the cash flow volatility. Our measure of CFVolt+1 is calculated based on four quarterly earnings numbers, 
and CFVolt+1~t+3 is calculated based on twelve quarterly earnings numbers. Therefore, throughout the analyses, we 
focus on daily stock return volatility as our main measure of firm risk, and use this cash flow volatility measure as a 
robustness check.  
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For robustness, we also calculate these three measures (R&D/Sales, Lev, AssetLiq) over 
the fiscal years t+1 to t+3 by taking the annual average to examine whether firms take on more 
financial risk or investment risk.  
 
3.5. Measurement of executive compensation 
To explore differences in executive compensation structure between firms that made bad 
acquisitions and their counterparts, we obtain CEO compensation data from ExecuComp 
database. Starting from 1992, ExecuComp provides detailed information for CEO salary, bonus, 
stocks, and option grants for S&P 1500 firms. To measure CEO incentives, we calculate a ratio 
of CEO’s equity-based compensation (stock and option values) to CEO’s base salary, 
EquityRatio, in fiscal year t+1. For robustness, we also calculate EquityRatio over the fiscal 
years t+1 to t+3 by taking the annual average to examine whether CEO pay structure is more 
tilted towards equity-based compensation for firms that have made bad acquisitions.  
 
3.6. Sample selection and summary statistics 
In order to be able to calculate stock return volatility for fiscal year t+1, our sample 
includes only firms for which we can obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).  We also require firms to have financial statement information from 
Compustat as of fiscal year t and t+1. In line with prior literature, we exclude financial firms 
(SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Our final sample contains an unbalanced panel 
of 87,518 firm-year observations from 11,130 firms between fiscal year 1990 and 2010. Panel A 
of Table 1 provides the distribution of the sample firms across fiscal years, and our sample is 
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evenly distributed over time. Panel B presents the Fama-French twelve industry classification; 
and as can be seen, our sample covers a broad spectrum of industries.   
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of various firm characteristics. We report the 
full sample mean, median, standard deviation, along with bottom and top quartiles. The average 
firm in our sample has a book value of $2.0 billion and a market capitalization of $2.2 billion. 
The sample medians are much smaller than the sample means, namely $178 million in total 
assets and $174 million in market capitalization. The median firm in our sample is 10 years old, 
has a market-book ratio of 1.9, and sales growth rate of 8.8%. The mean (median) stock return 
over the prior fiscal year is 15.5% (2.3%), the debt-equity ratio is 58.6% (16.5%), and the cash 
surplus is 2.7% (4.5%), respectively. Detailed definitions for each of the variables are provided 
in the Appendix. 
Table 2 also reports the summary statistics of our risk measures. The mean (median) 
value of TotRiskt+1 is 8.132 (8.080), while the mean (median) value of SysRisk t+1 is 4.474 
(4.820), and the mean (median) value of IdioRisk t+1 is 8.002 (7.955). The magnitude is 
comparable to the levels reported in Low (2009). The cash flow volatility in the next fiscal year 
has a mean of 0.031, and a median of 0.013. An average firm has a leverage ratio of 22.3%, an 
asset liquidity ratio of 25.7%, and an R&D/sales ratio of 19%. For the average CEO in our 
sample, equity-based compensation is 3.784 times base salary.  
In our sample of 87,518 firm-year observations from 1990 to 2010, about 9.7% of firm-
year observations feature acquisition deals, and 2.5% of them are associated with bad 
acquisitions which significantly reduced shareholder value around the deal announcement. We 
also provide summary statistics for external and internal governance measures. Among our 
sample, 50.5% of firm-years have blockholders, and an average firm is covered by four financial 
15 
 
 
analysts. The mean CEO age is 55 years, and he has served in this role for 11 years. On average, 
a firm has nine antitakeover provisions in place.  
 
4. Hypothesis Tests and Results 
4.1. Bad acquisition and stock return volatility  
4.1.1. Baseline results 
 Decision makers who view themselves in the domain of losses are more prone to accept 
risks than agents who view themselves in the domain of gains. We measure firm’s risk-taking 
behaviors using the volatility of future stock returns. Consider hypothesis H1a which states that 
higher stock return volatility is associated with firms that made bad acquisitions than with their 
counterparts. To test this hypothesis, we follow the prior literature and estimate the following 
multivariate model to examine the impact of a bad acquisition on the firm’s risk-taking behaviors: 
  (1) 
We examine future stock return volatility using TotRisk in fiscal year t+1. We expect the 
coefficient of Bad acquisition on TotRisk, β, to be positive, as firms who experience significant 
negative wealth changes after acquisitions are more likely to view themselves in the domain of 
losses, and therefore prone to take on greater risk.  
We follow Cassell et al. (2012) and control for a set of variables that have been shown to 
have a significant impact on firms’ risk taking behaviors. We control for firm size by using the 
natural logarithm of total assets since larger firms are less likely to make risky investments 
(Pastor and Veronesi, 2003). We include the natural logarithm of firm age to control for the life 
cycle of the firm, as firms might display systematic differences in their risk levels during 
different phases of their life cycles. We further include market-to-book ratio and sales growth to 
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control for investment and growth opportunities. In addition, we control for past stock returns, 
leverage, and cash surplus (Coles et al., 2006). In all regressions we include a fiscal-year fixed 
effect to control for time-series variation over time. We report OLS coefficients and t-statistics 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering.  
Table 3 presents the regression results for equation (1). Panel A reports firm risk 
measures with daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1. In Column (1), we control for Fama-French 
48 industry fixed effect, and find supporting evidence for H1a that firms experienced bad 
acquisitions are associated with higher stock return volatility than their counterparts. The 
coefficient estimate of Bad acquisition on TotRisk is 0.137 and significant at the 1% level. Since 
TotRisk is a logarithmic variable, the coefficient estimate of Bad acquisition measures the semi-
elasticity of a firm’s stock return variance with respect to whether or not the firm engaged in a 
bad acquisition. The magnitude of the Bad acquisition coefficient estimate in Column (1) 
suggests that engaging in a bad acquisition is associated with a 13.7% increase in the variance of 
daily stock returns in next fiscal year, a magnitude we would deem to be economically 
significant.  
To test hypothesis H1b, we add a firm fixed effect to control for any time-invariant firm 
characteristics and to examine within firm variation in Column (2). In this regard, we continue to 
observe a positive and significant coefficient on Bad acquisition, which supports H1b that the 
risk profiles of firms that made bad acquisitions are higher after the announcement of the 
acquisition than before.  
When we separate total risk into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component 
(SysRisk and IdioRisk), we find that the coefficient estimates of Bad acquisition on SysRisk are 
positive and significant (see Columns (3) and (4)), and the coefficient estimates of Bad 
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acquisition on IdioRisk are also positive and significant (see Columns (5) and (6)). These 
findings suggest that after bad acquisitions firms take on more systematic risk as well as more 
idiosyncratic risk. 
The coefficients on the other control variables are consistent with the findings in the 
literature. In line with Low (2009) and Cassell et al. (2012), we find that larger, older firms, 
firms with better recent stock performance and lower debt-equity ratios, and firms with more 
available funds are associated with significantly lower stock return volatility.   
In Panel B of Table 3, we use a longer three-year window as an alternative to calculate 
stock return volatilities, and continue to find robust evidence that firms that made bad 
acquisitions engage in more risk-taking behaviors than their counterparts. In later analyses, we 
focus primarily on risk measures calculated using daily stock returns in the next fiscal year; 
however, all our results are robust to using the longer-window volatility measures. 
 
4.1.2. Effect of external and internal governance 
 External and internal governance disciplines managers who make value-destroying 
acquisitions (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). These findings suggest that 
stronger governance and monitoring might put more pressure on CEOs who make bad 
acquisitions, and exacerbate the psychological tendency to become more risk seeking in the 
domain of losses. In this section, we investigate hypothesis H2 to examine whether among firms 
that made bad acquisitions, those with stronger external and internal governance feature higher 
stock return volatility.  In this regard, we examine the role of external governance as measured 
by the presence of large shareholders and analyst coverage, and internal governance as measured 
by CEO’s age, tenure, and firm’s antitakeover provisions.  
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) suggest that large shareholders (blockholders) have 
sufficient incentives to engage in costly monitoring of managers. To construct a measure that 
captures the presence of large shareholders, we create an indicator variable Blockholder, which 
equals one if there exists an institutional holder with at least 5% of the share holdings, and zero 
otherwise. We obtain institutional ownership data from Thomson’s CDA/Spectrum Database 
(form 13F). Panel A of Table 4 reports results for the regression used to test H2. Since we are 
interested in the cross-sectional variation, we control for Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects. 
We find that the existence of blockholders is associated with lower firm risk, especially 
idiosyncratic risk, as the coefficients of Blockholder are both negative and significant in 
Columns (1) and (3). We also find that a firm’s systematic risk is higher when there is a large 
shareholder, as the coefficient of Blockholder in Column (2) is positive and significant. More 
importantly, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term Bad acquisition * Blockholder are 
positive and significant at the 1% level in both Column (1) and (3), suggesting that in the 
presence of blockholders, a firm’s total risk as well as its idiosyncratic risk are higher for firms 
that made bad acquisitions.  
Financial analysts serve as external monitors of firms’ managers (Yu, 2008; Ellul and 
Panayides, 2009). In a survey of US CFOs, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) show that due 
to their own wealth, career, and reputation concerns, a majority of CFOs are willing to sacrifice 
long-term firm value to meet the desired short-term earnings targets. This finding leads us to 
conjecture that analysts might increase pressure on CEOs who made bad acquisitions, and 
amplify their risk seeking attitude. Panel B of Table 4 presents evidence to support this 
conjecture. We obtain analyst coverage data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) Database. For each fiscal year of a firm, we take the average of the 12 monthly 
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numbers of earnings forecasts given by the summary file as our measure of number of analysts, 
compute the natural logarithm of (one plus) this measure, and then construct a term  to measure 
its interaction with Bad acquisition. The interaction term Bad acquisition * Log(no. of analysts) 
shows up positively and significantly in Column (1) and (3), and negatively and significantly in 
Column (2), suggesting that when there is a broader analyst coverage, firms that made bad 
acquisitions feature both higher total risk and higher idiosyncratic risk, but lower systematic risk.  
We next turn to a few measures of internal firm governance. Our first measure is CEO 
age. Younger CEOs do not have a long track record to back them up, and they are less likely to 
be entrenched. They will face higher risk and pressure from the labor market after unsuccessful 
acquisitions. Using U.S. plant-level data, Li, Low, and Makhija (2011) show that younger CEOs 
undertake more active and bolder investment activities. We collect CEO age from ExecuComp 
which covers S&P1500 firms starting from 1992, and interact Bad acquisition and Log(CEO age) 
in Panel C of Table 4. We note that data availability restrictions in ExecuComp data reduce the 
size of our sample. The coefficient estimates on the interaction term Bad acquisition * Log(CEO 
age) are all negative and significant across three columns, consistent with our conjecture that 
younger CEOs of firms that made bad acquisitions take on larger risk than their older 
counterparts.  
Our second internal governance measure is CEO tenure. Dikolli et al. (2013) find that the 
negative relation between CEO turnover and firm performance monotonically declines with CEO 
tenure. This finding is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) who report that board 
independence declines over a CEO’s tenure because longer tenured CEOs acquire greater 
negotiating power resulting in less independent boards. We obtain CEO tenure data from both 
ExecuComp and Risk Metrics Director Database, and present our results in Panel D of Table 4. 
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The coefficient estimates on the interaction term Bad acquisition * Log(CEO tenure) are 
negative and significant in both Columns (1) and (3), suggesting that, shorter tenured CEOs who 
have made bad acquisitions take both larger total risk and larger idiosyncratic risk.  
We also examine the effect of antitakeover provisions which firms have put in place. 
Gompers et al. (2003) document negative relations between antitakeover provisions and firm 
value. Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience 
significantly lower announcement returns, suggesting that managers at firms protected by more 
antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate 
control. Therefore, the fewer antitakeover provisions firms have in place, the more pressure 
managers who have made bad acquisitions will feel to increase their firms’ risk exposures. We 
collect antitakeover provisions data from Risk Metrics Governance Database. The Risk Metrics 
publications cover 24 unique antitakeover provisions, from which GIM construct their 
governance index by adding one point for each provision that enhances managerial power. Firms 
with higher GIM indices are associated with more entrenched managers. Panel E of Table 4 
presents the interaction results of Bad acquisition and GIM index. The coefficient estimates on 
the interaction term are all negative and significant, supporting our conjecture that stronger 
governance and monitoring puts more pressure to increase risk exposure on CEOs who have 
made bad acquisitions. 
 
4.1.3. Magnitude of bad acquisition 
 We next turn our attention to hypothesis H3, which states that the lower the 
announcement returns associated with bad acquisitions, the more likely are firms to engage in 
greater risk-taking. In the discussion above, we report evidence consistent with risk being higher 
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for that firms that made bad acquisitions. In this subsection, we demonstrate that the magnitude 
of bad acquisitions is also germane.  
We proxy for the magnitude of bad acquisitions by using the announcement return 
ACAR of acquirers. Moreover, instead of an indicator variable Bad acquisition, we study the 
level of ACARs of bad acquisitions. Based on our hypothesis, the lower the ACAR, the more 
likely are the firm and its managers to perceive themselves as being in the domain of losses, and 
the more likely is the firm to engage in greater risk-taking. Therefore we expect to observe a 
negative relation between the level of ACARs and firm’s future stock return volatilities.  
 Table 5 presents the results. We find that the lower the ACAR associated with bad 
acquisitions, the higher the total risk. The coefficient of ACAR of bad acquisition in Column (1) 
is -0.016 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a one percentage points reduction in 
ACAR is associated with a 1.6% increase in the variance of daily stock returns in the next fiscal 
year. When we further decompose total risk into systematic and idiosyncratic components in 
Columns (3)-(6), we find that both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk are negatively 
associated with the magnitude of ACARs. Overall, these results suggest firms’ risk-taking 
behaviors depend not only on the dichotomous variable measuring whether or not firms engaged 
in bad acquisitions, but also on the magnitude of these bad acquisitions.   
 
4.1.4. Endogeneity concerns and alternative explanations 
Omitted variables: One concern with our baseline finding is that there exist omitted variables 
that might drive both the incidence of unsuccessful acquisitions and the higher firm risk 
subsequent to the merger announcement. In our earlier regressions, we include firm fixed effects 
to control for any time-invariant firm characteristics, and continue to find significantly higher 
22 
 
 
firm risks following bad acquisitions. In this section, we also control for CEO overconfidence 
and executive compensation structure, and continue to find supporting evidence for the finding 
that risk is higher for firms that made bad acquisitions than for their counterparts.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that some personal characteristics of CEOs, most 
notably overconfidence, lead to distortions in corporate investment policies. Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs also overpay for targets and undertake value-
destroying mergers. As a result, we consider the possibility that firms with overconfident CEOs 
are more simultaneously likely to engage in bad acquisitions, and also to be more likely to take 
higher firm risk. To address this possibility, we include an executive option-based CEO 
overconfidence measure as an additional control variable in our baseline regression.  
Our CEO overconfidence measure is constructed from the ExecuComp database. 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), the variable Confident CEO takes a value one if a 
CEO postpones the exercise of vested options that are at least 67% in the money, and zero 
otherwise. If a CEO is identified as overconfident by this measure, she remains so for the rest of 
the sample period. As we do not have detailed data on a CEO’s options holdings and exercise 
prices for each option grant, we follow Campbell et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) to 
calculate the average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for each year.4 As shown in 
Campbell et al. (2011), this measure of overconfidence generates results similar to those in 
Malmendier and Tate (2005). Panel A of Table 6 presents the regression results with the 
additional Confident CEO control variable. We find that Confident CEO measure shows up 
positively and significantly, suggesting that overconfident CEOs do take on more firm risk. More 
                                                          
4
 First, for each CEO-year, we calculate the average realizable value per option by dividing the total realizable value 
of the options by the number of options held by the CEO. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal year-end stock 
price minus the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is then calculated as the stock price 
divided by the estimated strike price minus one. As we are only interested in options that the CEO can exercise, we 
include only the vested options held by the CEO. 
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importantly, we continue to observe positive and significant coefficients on Bad acquisition, and 
the economic and statistical magnitudes do not differ much from Table 3. Therefore, CEO 
overconfidence is unlikely to be the main driver for the observed relation between bad 
acquisitions and higher firm risk.  
Another potential omitted variable is CEO compensation incentives. More equity-based 
compensation might induce CEOs to make more bad acquisitions as well as take greater firm risk. 
Coles et al. (2006) and Low (2009) provide empirical evidence that equity-based compensation 
affects managers’ risk-taking behaviors. To alleviate the concern that CEO compensation 
structure drives both bad acquisitions and greater firm risk, we include the ratio of equity-based 
compensation to base salary in fiscal year t, EquityRatio, in our baseline regression. Panel B of 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression to test the equity-based compensation explanation. 
We find that Bad acquisition continues to have a positive and significant effect on firm risk 
measures, and the economic magnitudes are similar to Table 3. Notably, if we instead include 
delta (sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price) and vega (sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
volatility) as additional control variables, our key findings remain unchanged. We conclude that 
potential omitted variables such as CEO overconfidence and executive compensation structure 
do not explain the observed higher firm risk following bad acquisitions.  
 
Alternative interpretations: Here we consider three additional explanations for our findings that 
firms that made bad acquisitions take on higher risk than their counterparts. The first potential 
explanation is that acquisition deals, both good and bad, will increase firm size and improve a 
firm’s ability to take on more risk. In other words, firm risk might increase after acquisitions 
generally, not just after bad acquisitions. To address this issue, we regress our risk measures on 
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an indicator variable, Acquisition, which equals one if the firm has engaged in acquisitions in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. Panel C of Table 6 reports the results of the regression used to test 
the size explanation. Notably, none of the coefficient estimates of Acquisition is significant, 
suggesting that general acquisitions do not induce firms to take on higher risk. We also create 
another indicator variable, Good acquisition, which equals one if the firm has engaged in 
acquisitions which has a three-day ACAR greater or equal to 3% in fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Again, none of the coefficient estimates of this good acquisition indicator are significant. 
Collectively, these results suggest that higher firm risk is not associated with either general 
acquisition deals or good acquisition deals, but is associated with bad acquisitions.  
The second alternative explanation for our main finding is that bad acquisitions were 
actually intended as investments to increase risk, so that their failure led firms to seek increase 
risk by other means. If this explanation were to be valid, then we would expect target firms to 
have significantly higher risk profiles in bad acquisitions than in other acquisitions. To test 
whether this might be the case, we examine target firm’s idiosyncratic volatility during the one-
year period prior to the deal announcement. Notably, we find no significant difference in the 
riskiness of the target firms, whether the acquisition was good or bad. Therefore, we conclude 
that this alternative explanation is unlikely to drive our finding that firms that made bad 
acquisitions take on higher risk than their counterparts.  
The third alternative explanation for our finding is that a failed acquisition might cause 
the firm to end up with more leverage, because the firm used debt to fund the acquisition. In this 
regard, when leverage is higher, firms are more likely to take on riskier projects because 
shareholders enjoy the upside associated with the risk while debt holders bear the downside 
(Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To address this possibility, we focus on 
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all-equity financed acquisitions where leverage does not increase. Panel D of Table 6 reports our 
regression results. Notably, we find that even when acquisitions are purely financed by equity, 
firms that made bad acquisitions are still riskier than their counterparts. 
The above discussions support the robustness of our main finding that firms that made 
bad acquisitions perceive themselves in the domain of losses and take on more risk than their 
counterparts. In the following section, we investigate potential channels through which a firm 
can increase its risk profile. 
 
4.2. Potential channels of increased firm risk 
The higher risk associate with firms that made bad acquisitions should be reflected in 
their cash flows. In this regard, we test hypothesis H4a to examine whether cash flow volatility is 
higher for firms that made bad acquisitions. We measure a firm’s risk-taking behaviors by using 
the volatility of its future cash flows. As discussed earlier, we calculate the standard deviation of 
quarterly earnings in the fiscal year t+1, as well as in the fiscal years t+1 to t+3. Although we 
still have a relatively short time-series quarterly earnings data, this is the best we can do to study 
the cash flow volatility after bad acquisitions. We estimate equation (1) where we proxy for firm 
risk with future cash flow volatility, and report the regression results in Table 7.  
Consistent with our results on stock return volatility, we find that cash flow volatility is 
significantly higher for firms that made bad acquisitions. The coefficient estimate of Bad 
acquisition on CFVolt+1 is 0.007 and significant at the 10% level in Column (1), while the 
coefficient estimate of Bad acquisition on CFVolt+1~t+3 is 0.004 and significant at the 5% level in 
Column (2). These magnitudes are economically significant as the sample means of CFVolt+1 
and CFVolt+1~t+3 are 0.031 and 0.044, respectively, suggesting that firms which made bad 
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acquisitions increase their cash flow volatility by 22.6% (=0.007/0.031) in the subsequent fiscal 
year, and by 9.1% (=0.004/0.044) in the subsequent three fiscal years. We discuss the impact of 
firm age, return, D/E, and cash surplus in section 5 below. 
When we replace the Bad acquisition indicator with a continuous variable of acquirer’s 
announcement returns in Table 7 Column (3) and (4), we find that the lower the announcement 
returns, the higher the cash flow volatility, suggesting that firms’ cash flow volatility also 
depends on the magnitude of these bad acquisitions.  
Next, we investigate the potential channels through which a firm can engage in risk-
taking behaviors. Firms can increase the volatility of future firm performance either through 
adopting more aggressive financial policies, or investing in more risky investment projects. In 
this regard, we consider Hypotheses H4b and H4c, which state that firms which made bad 
acquisitions will choose financial and investment policies that are more risky than the choices of 
their counterparts. To do so, we first examine the association between bad acquisitions and firms’ 
financial policies. Our measures for firm financial risk are Lev and AssetLiq, as firms can 
increase their financial risk by taking on more debt and/or holding less liquid assets. We estimate 
equation (1) with the left-hand-side variables being Lev and AssetLiq in the next fiscal year and 
in the next three fiscal years respectively.  
Consider Columns (1)-(4) of Panel A Table 8, which contain the results of the regression 
used to test Hypotheses H4b. The coefficient reported in Column (1) indicates that in the year 
following a bad acquisition, a firm significantly increases its leverage ratio by 1.2%. The finding 
is also economically meaningful compared to the sample mean (median) leverage ratio of 22.3% 
(18.5%). Meanwhile, firms hold less liquid assets as the coefficient estimate in Column (3) for 
Bad acquisition on AssetLiqt+1 is -0.026 and significant at the 1% level. Given the sample mean 
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AssetLiqt+1 of 0.257, this suggests that firms which made bad acquisitions firms reduce their 
holdings in liquid assets by 10.1% (=0.026/0.257). These results support our hypothesis that 
firms that made bad acquisitions take on more financial risk than their counterparts.  
We also examine firms’ investment policies subsequent to a bad acquisition. We measure 
a firm’s investment in risk projects by the variable R&D/Sales, as research and development 
projects are perceived to be more uncertain and more risky, compared to other investment 
choices such as capital expenditures. Column (5) and (6) of Panel A report the relevant 
regression results testing Hypotheses H4c. We find that in the fiscal year immediately following 
bad acquisitions, the R&D sales ratio does not increase significantly. However, if we look at a 
longer three-year window, we find a positive and significant coefficient on R&D/Sales. These 
results suggest that after bad acquisitions firms increase the risk levels in their investment 
policies. In this regard, it might take a few years to implement the changes in real investments, 
while it is relatively quick and easy to modify financial policies to increase firm risk.  
 Panel B of Table 8 reports the regression results where we replace Bad acquisition 
indicator with a continuous variable of acquirer’s announcement returns. We find that the 
magnitude of bad acquisitions also affects the riskiness of firms’ financial and investment 
policies, as both leverage ratio and R&D sales ratio decrease with ACAR, and asset liquidity 
ratio increases with ACAR. This is consistent with our earlier findings in stock return volatilities, 
suggesting that firms’ risk-taking behaviors not only depend on whether firms engaged in bad 
acquisitions, but also depend on the magnitude of these bad acquisitions.   
 
4.3. Executive compensation 
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In this section, we study executive compensation after acquisitions to explore the impact 
of CEO incentives on our main finding about risk taking and bad acquisitions. We test 
hypothesis H5 to examine whether for firms that have made bad acquisitions, CEO compensation 
is more equity-based than in counterpart firms. To do so, we measure CEO equity incentives 
with EquityRatio, which is the ratio between CEO’s equity-based compensation (stock and 
option values) and CEO’s base salary. We estimate equation (1) with the left-hand-side variables 
being replaced with EquityRatio in the subsequent fiscal year and in the subsequent three fiscal 
years respectively.  
Table 9 presents the regression results. In addition to the same control variables as in 
equation (1), we also include EquityRatio in fiscal year t to control for the current compensation 
structure. Consistent with hypothesis H5, we find that firms that made bad acquisitions feature 
more equity-based CEO compensation. The coefficient estimate of Bad acquisition on 
EquityRatiot+1 is 0.565 and significant at the 10% level in Column (1), while the coefficient 
estimate of Bad acquisition on EquityRatiot+1~t+3 is 0.825 and significant at the 1% level in 
Column (2). These magnitudes are economically significant as the sample means of 
EquityRatiot+1 and EquityRatiot+1~t+3 are 3.784 and 3.964, respectively. When we replace the 
Bad acquisition indicator with a continuous variable of acquirer’s announcement returns in 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, we find CEO’s pay incentives also depends on the magnitude of 
these bad acquisitions. Interestingly, if we replace Bad acquisition indicator with an Acquisition 
indicator or Good acquisition indicator, we do not observe any significant effect for CEO 
compensation structure.  
Overall, our findings suggest that after unsuccessful acquisitions, as boards of directors 
and/or CEOs view themselves in the domain of losses and become more risk tolerant, they 
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redesign the executive compensation contract towards more equity-based to motivate higher 
levels of risk taking.  
  
5. Discussion: Caveats  
Our findings occur against a backdrop of relationships that are a part of the existing 
literature. For example, in line with Low (2009) and Cassell et al. (2012), larger, older firms, 
firms with better recent stock performance and lower debt-equity ratio, and firms with more 
available funds are associated with significantly lower stock return volatility.  
As can be seen from Tables 3 and 8, we find that firms with more cash surplus are less 
risky, have lower leverage, and do not significantly change R&D. The negative coefficients of 
cash surplus on risk measures and leverage are consistent with Cassell et al. (2012), although 
they do not provide detailed explanations for why this should be the case. We believe that our 
various measures of risk reflect potential for default. For firms with ample cash available to 
finance new projects, leverage is lower in accordance with the pecking order principle, and 
default risk is lower because of higher coverage ratios, with both features being reflected in stock 
return volatility.  
Three features of our results did surprise us. The first surprise pertains to the result that 
cash flow volatility is positively related to firm age, and negatively related to cash surplus (Table 
7). In contrast to stock return volatility, where the sign for age is negative, older firms feature 
higher cash flow volatility. In addition, the coefficients associated with past return and debt-to-
equity are significant for stock return volatility (in the expected directions) in Table 3, but not for 
CFVolt+1 in Table 7 Column (1) and (3). If we examine cash flow volatility using a longer 
window CFVolt+1~t+3, the coefficients associated with past return and debt-to-equity are 
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significant in the expected directions (Table 7 Column 2 and 4). We do acknowledge that our 
measure of cash flow volatility is quite coarse as the best available data to us is quarterly 
earnings.  
The second surprising finding is regarding R&D investment. Other papers such as Coles 
et al. (2006) and Cassell et al. (2012) find a positive and significant coefficient of cash surplus on 
R&D, while we do not (Table 8, Columns 5 and 6). We recognize that their sample is quite 
different from ours. When we add an interaction term of cash surplus and the bad acquisition 
indicator in our regression to investigate whether our R&D finding also holds for bad 
acquisitions, we find that it does.  
The third surprise pertains to coefficients on market-to-book (M/B). Low (2009) finds 
positive and significant coefficients for M/B in stock return volatility regressions, while Cassell 
et al. (2012) find negative and significant coefficients of M/B on return volatility and on 
R&D/sales. Cassell et al. (2012) have some discussion on this, stating: “... high-growth firms 
may be inclined to take on additional risk. Alternatively, high-growth firms are generally young 
firms that may have more difficulty accessing capital needed to finance risky investment 
projects.”  
In this regard, our results feature positive and significant coefficients of M/B on 
systematic risk, and negative coefficients on idiosyncratic risk, with cancellation for the joint 
effect on total risk, as its coefficient turns out to be insignificant. Cassell et al. (2012) find 
negative coefficients on risk measures (total risk and idiosyncratic risk), and they do control for 
firm age, which also has a negative coefficient. Low (2009) has a positive coefficient of M/B on 
total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risk; however, she does not control for firm age.  
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Our result seems to suggest that high-growth firms take on more risk that can be 
compensated by the market, while reducing the risk which cannot be compensated (perhaps due 
to resource constraints). In this regard, although we do control for firm age, it is possible that age 
is an imperfect measure for firms’ access to financing. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the approach in this paper focuses mostly on the 
risk and value characteristics of acquiring firm managers, and less on issues pertaining to 
sentiment. In this regard, our working hypothesis is that markets efficiently price both targets and 
acquirers.  
There is an empirical issue associated with mispricing of acquirers. As it happens, 
acquisitions are generally associated with negative risk adjusted abnormal returns in the long run, 
although some have positive abnormal returns around the deal announcement dates. This finding 
has been established in the literature, and we can confirm that the finding holds within our 
sample. Betton, Eckbo, and Thurborn (2008) describe three possible explanations for the post-
merger underperformance, beginning with sentiment. First, the market slowly corrects its 
overvaluation of the merged firms’ shares. Second, the merger is a response to a negative 
industry shock, with securities being efficiently priced and correctly reflecting the merged firm 
performing better than it would have without the merger. Third, the estimation of 
underperformance stems from some artifact in the econometric methodology.   
In respect to the sentiment-based explanation, the important issue for our argument is that 
relative prices are correct, meaning that prices correctly reflect the risks associated with bad 
acquisitions relative to good acquisitions. If so, our results would be valid, even if acquiring 
firms were generally overpriced at the time of the acquisition announcements. 
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6. Conclusion 
M&A activities are among the largest and most visible forms of corporate investment 
impacting shareholder wealth. The behavioral literature suggests that the outcomes of M&A 
deals will significantly alter managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking, with a negative 
outcome leading to increased risk. In this regard, announcement returns surrounding M&A 
transactions provide a good proxy for whether managers view themselves as being in the domain 
of gains or the domain losses, so that a positive (negative) reaction by the market will place 
managers psychologically into the corresponding domain.  
Our main finding is that firms which made bad acquisitions take on more systematic risk 
as well as more idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts, with risk being measured by the 
volatility of equity returns. In this regard, the worse the acquisition, the higher the total risk, 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk. What makes this finding germane is that higher risk is not 
associated with general acquisitions or good acquisitions.  
Firms that make bad acquisitions tend to have different characteristics from counterparts. 
Our analysis indicates that are bigger, have higher market-to-book ratios, higher sales growth, 
higher earnings, and lower debt-equity ratios. However, prior to the acquisition announcement, 
their stock returns and cash flows exhibit no significant differences relative to counterparts. 
Potential omitted variables such as CEO overconfidence and executive compensation 
incentives do not explain the observed higher risk for firms that made bad acquisitions. In 
addition, we find that the risk profile of a firm that made a bad acquisition is intensified if the 
firm faces stronger external (existence of blockholder and broader analyst coverage) and internal 
governance (younger CEO, shorter-tenure CEO, and less antitakeover provisions). These 
33 
 
 
findings are in line with the behavioral approach suggesting that in the domain of losses, decision 
makers generally become more tolerant of risk. 
Our analysis suggests that the increased risk for firms that made bad acquisitions can be 
traced to five specific elements.  First, is cash flow volatility: the worse the acquisition the higher 
the cash flow volatility. Second, is higher leverage. Third, is the reduction in holdings of liquid 
assets. Fourth, is increased risk in choice of investment policies. Fifth is, CEO compensation 
structure, which tilts more towards equity-based pay.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions  Data Source 
Firm Characteristics    
Total assets Total assets in millions  Compustat 
Market capitalization Market value of equity in millions.  Compustat 
Firm age Firm age.  Compustat 
M/B ratio The ratio of market value of equity to the 
book value of assets. 
 Compustat 
Sales growth The percentage change in total sales from 
the previous year. 
 Compustat 
Return The stock return over fiscal year t.  CRSP 
D/E ratio The ratio of total debt to the market value 
of equity. 
 Compustat 
Cash surplus Net cash flow from operations minus 
depreciation expense plus research and 
development expenditures, scaled by total 
assets. 
 Compustat 
    
Risk Measures    
TotRisk t+1 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily stock returns in fiscal year 
t+1.  
 CRSP 
TotRisk t+1~t+3 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily stock returns in fiscal 
years t+1 to t+3. 
 CRSP 
SysRisk t+1 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily expected stock returns in 
fiscal year t+1.  
 CRSP 
SysRisk t+1~t+3 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily expected stock returns in 
fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 CRSP 
IdioRisk t+1 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily residual stock returns in 
fiscal year t+1.  
 CRSP 
IdioRisk t+1~t+3 The natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of daily residual stock returns in 
fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 CRSP 
CFVol t+1 The standard deviation of quarterly 
earnings in the fiscal year t+1. 
 Compustat 
CFVol t+1~t+3 The standard deviation of quarterly 
earnings in the fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 Compustat 
Leverage t+1 The ratio of total debt to total assets in  Compustat 
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fiscal year t+1.  
Leverage t+1~t+3 The average ratio of total debt to total 
assets in fiscal years t+1 to t+3.  
 Compustat 
AssetLiq t+1 Current assets minus current liabilities, 
scaled by total assets, in fiscal year t+1.  
 Compustat 
AssetLiq t+1~t+3 Current assets minus current liabilities, 
scaled by total assets, average across fiscal 
years t+1 to t+3.  
 Compustat 
R&D/Sales t+1 The ratio of R&D expenditures to total 
sales, in fiscal year t+1.  
 Compustat 
R&D/Sales t+1~t+3 The ratio of R&D expenditures to total 
sales, average across fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 Compustat 
EquityRatio t+1 The ratio of CEO equity-based 
compensation to base salary, in fiscal year 
t+1.  
 ExecuComp 
EquityRatio t+1~t+3 The ratio of CEO equity-based 
compensation to base salary, average 
across fiscal years t+1 to t+3. 
 ExecuComp 
    
Acquisition measures    
Bad acquisition  Indicator variable: 1 for firm-years engaged 
in acquisitions in fiscal year t where ACAR 
<= -3%, 0 otherwise.  
 SDC/CRSP 
Acquisition Indicator variable: 1 for firm-years engaged 
in acquisitions in fiscal year t, 0 otherwise.  
 SDC/CRSP 
Good acquisition Indicator variable: 1 for firm-years engaged 
in acquisitions in fiscal year t where 
ACAR >= 3%, 0 otherwise.  
 SDC/CRSP 
    
External and internal governance measures 
Blockholder Indicator variable: 1 if there exists an 
institutional holder with at least 5% stock 
ownership, 0 otherwise.  
 Thomson 
CDA/Spectrum 
No. of analysts Average of the 12 monthly number of 
earnings forecasts for each fiscal year of a 
firm. 
 I/B/E/S 
CEO age Age of the CEO.   ExecuComp 
CEO tenure Tenure of the CEO.   ExecuComp/ 
RiskMetrics 
GIM index Antitakeover provision index constructed 
by Gompers, Ishill, and Metrick (2003)  
 RiskMetrics 
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Table 1: Sample distribution 
 
Panel A and B present the distribution of sample firm-year observations by fiscal year and by 
firm industry classification, respectively. Our sample contains 87,518 firm-year observations 
from 1990 to 2010.  
 
Panel A: By fiscal year 
 
Year No. of observations Percent 
1990 3,726 4.3% 
1991 3,749 4.3% 
1992 3,809 4.4% 
1993 4,105 4.7% 
1994 4,459 5.1% 
1995 4,671 5.3% 
1996 4,932 5.6% 
1997 5,264 6.0% 
1998 5,163 5.9% 
1999 4,908 5.6% 
2000 4,757 5.4% 
2001 4,622 5.3% 
2002 4,283 4.9% 
2003 4,040 4.6% 
2004 3,892 4.4% 
2005 3,794 4.3% 
2006 3,711 4.2% 
2007 3,586 4.1% 
2008 3,515 4.0% 
2009 3,336 3.8% 
2010 3,196 3.7% 
Total 87,518 100.0% 
 
Panel B: By Fama-French twelve industry classification 
 
Fama-French industry No. of observations Percent 
Consumer nondurables 6,208 7.1% 
Consumer durables 2,940 3.4% 
Manufacturing 12,175 13.9% 
Oil, gas and coal 4,437 5.1% 
Chemical products 2,533 2.9% 
Business equipment 20,548 23.5% 
Telephone and television 3,436 3.9% 
Wholesale and retail 11,093 12.7% 
Healthcare 10,870 12.4% 
Other 13,278 15.2% 
Total 87,518 100.0% 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the full sample summary statistics of 87,518 firm-year observations between 
1990 and 2010. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
Variables N Mean Median STD P25 P75 
Firm Characteristics 
      Total assets ($mil) 87,518 2,003 178 6,313 42 873 
Market capitalization ($mil) 87,518 2,170 174 7,216 37 892 
Firm age 87,518 14.787 10.000 14.068 5.000 20.000 
M/B ratio 87,518 2.859 1.909 4.392 1.093 3.411 
Sales growth 87,518 0.205 0.088 0.621 -0.031 0.256 
Return 87,518 0.155 0.023 0.748 -0.294 0.383 
D/E ratio 87,518 0.586 0.165 1.251 0.014 0.544 
Cash surplus 87,518 0.027 0.045 0.168 -0.022 0.110 
       Risk Measures 
      TotRisk t+1 87,518 8.132 8.080 1.163 7.296 8.900 
TotRisk t+1~t+3 83,673 8.200 8.141 1.105 7.402 8.921 
SysRisk t+1 87,518 4.474 4.820 2.147 3.397 5.951 
SysRisk t+1~t+3 83,673 4.649 4.933 1.991 3.638 6.041 
IdioRisk t+1 87,518 8.002 7.955 1.231 7.104 8.826 
IdioRisk t+1~t+3 83,673 8.060 7.995 1.190 7.184 8.862 
CFVol t+1 69,184 0.031 0.013 0.054 0.006 0.031 
CFVol t+1~t+3 75,322 0.044 0.020 0.071 0.010 0.044 
Leverage t+1 79,660 0.223 0.185 0.214 0.026 0.347 
Leverage t+1~t+3 79,868 0.227 0.189 0.210 0.044 0.344 
AssetLiquidity t+1 79,480 0.257 0.239 0.254 0.072 0.430 
AssetLiquidity t+1~t+3 79,678 0.248 0.234 0.246 0.071 0.418 
R&D/Sales t+1 79,801 0.190 0.001 0.850 0.000 0.068 
R&D/Sales t+1~t+3 79,944 0.231 0.002 1.113 0.000 0.072 
EquityRatio t+1 21,269 3.784 1.634 6.817 0.160 4.261 
EquityRatio t+1~t+3 21,269 3.964 2.185 5.999 0.830 4.649 
       Acquisition measures 
      Bad acquisition 87,518 0.025 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.000 
Acquisition 87,518 0.097 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.000 
Good acquisition 87,518 0.038 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.000 
       External and internal governance 
     Blockholder 87,518 0.505 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
No. of analysts 87,518 3.925 1.000 5.771 0.000 5.000 
CEO age 16,285 55.174 55.000 7.250 50.000 60.000 
CEO tenure 14,189 11.063 8.000 8.805 4.000 15.000 
GIM index 14,489 9.152 9.000 2.604 7.000 11.000 
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Table 3: Bad acquisition and stock return volatility  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of firm-year observations between 1990 and 2010. Panel A reports stock 
return volatility with daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1, and Panel B reports stock return volatility with daily stock returns in fiscal 
years t+1 to t+3. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year fixed effects and industry/firm fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Stock return volatility with daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.137*** 0.069*** 0.269*** 0.089** 0.146*** 0.081*** 
 
(8.826) (4.892) (7.918) (2.574) (9.471) (5.707) 
Log(total assets) -0.285*** -0.203*** 0.296*** 0.310*** -0.327*** -0.252*** 
 
(-87.346) (-25.748) (46.454) (17.545) (-101.182) (-32.662) 
Log(firm age) -0.182*** -0.171*** -0.251*** -0.337*** -0.188*** -0.118*** 
 
(-23.279) (-9.302) (-16.795) (-9.441) (-24.149) (-6.620) 
M/B ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.034*** 0.019*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.203) (-0.673) (19.078) (10.913) (-3.203) (-3.225) 
Sales growth 0.028*** -0.000 0.130*** 0.048*** 0.024*** -0.001 
 
(5.975) (-0.072) (11.589) (3.846) (5.150) (-0.252) 
Return -0.048*** -0.036*** 0.267*** 0.248*** -0.060*** -0.049*** 
 
(-12.504) (-10.258) (31.420) (27.904) (-15.785) (-14.013) 
D/E ratio 0.228*** 0.214*** -0.038*** 0.012 0.246*** 0.230*** 
 
(49.175) (45.939) (-4.675) (1.207) (52.877) (48.515) 
Cash surplus -1.097*** -0.676*** -0.624*** -0.396*** -1.101*** -0.671*** 
 
(-42.605) (-25.355) (-11.671) (-5.947) (-42.553) (-25.200) 
Constant 9.400*** 9.159*** 2.407*** 3.193*** 9.561*** 9.220*** 
 
(93.504) (192.235) (14.887) (32.135) (94.981) (196.762) 
       Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
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Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583 0.749 0.302 0.463 0.629 0.775 
 
Panel B: Stock return volatility with daily stock returns in fiscal years t+1to t+3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.122*** 0.043*** 0.231*** 0.049* 0.132*** 0.054*** 
 
(7.668) (3.292) (7.739) (1.909) (8.245) (4.031) 
Log(total assets) -0.285*** -0.137*** 0.332*** 0.217*** -0.330*** -0.182*** 
 
(-82.239) (-16.050) (47.660) (12.016) (-95.575) (-21.232) 
Log(firm age) -0.183*** -0.185*** -0.268*** -0.457*** -0.189*** -0.116*** 
 
(-22.311) (-9.434) (-16.966) (-12.458) (-22.883) (-6.073) 
M/B ratio 0.000 0.001 0.033*** 0.014*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 
(0.424) (1.485) (18.101) (9.459) (-2.785) (-0.919) 
Sales growth 0.045*** 0.010** 0.140*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.011*** 
 
(9.265) (2.527) (14.003) (5.456) (8.788) (2.667) 
Return -0.042*** -0.031*** 0.213*** 0.149*** -0.052*** -0.040*** 
 
(-11.722) (-10.860) (29.172) (21.563) (-14.377) (-13.998) 
D/E ratio 0.214*** 0.156*** -0.091*** -0.029*** 0.234*** 0.171*** 
 
(41.731) (31.295) (-9.697) (-2.814) (45.416) (33.292) 
Cash surplus -1.154*** -0.587*** -0.544*** -0.248*** -1.172*** -0.587*** 
 
(-40.014) (-21.815) (-9.291) (-3.984) (-40.037) (-21.771) 
Constant 9.568*** 8.986*** 1.944*** 3.564*** 9.767*** 9.021*** 
 
(85.803) (176.259) (9.123) (36.691) (86.834) (177.222) 
       Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
Observations 83,673 83,673 83,673 83,673 83,673 83,673 
Adjusted R-squared 0.582 0.811 0.381 0.644 0.634 0.833 
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Table 4: Effect of external and internal governance 
 
This table presents the effect of external and internal governance on firm risk after bad 
acquisitions. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Blockholder 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.092*** 0.298*** 0.101*** 
 
(4.073) (5.817) (4.544) 
Bad acquisition * Blockholder 0.090*** -0.059 0.090*** 
 
(2.875) (-0.882) (2.897) 
Blockholder -0.209*** 0.123*** -0.220*** 
 
(-21.262) (5.941) (-22.581) 
    Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.590 0.303 0.636 
 
Panel B: Analyst coverage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.067*** 0.470*** 0.067*** 
 
(2.697) (7.907) (2.722) 
Bad acquisition * Log(no. of analysts) 0.053*** -0.160*** 0.060*** 
 
(3.701) (-5.180) (4.284) 
Log(no. of analysts) -0.024*** 0.339*** -0.045*** 
 
(-4.158) (27.595) (-7.770) 
    Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583 0.318 0.630 
 
Panel C: CEO age 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 2.861*** 4.522*** 2.414*** 
 
(3.820) (3.085) (3.176) 
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Bad acquisition * Log(CEO age) -0.682*** -1.087*** -0.566*** 
 
(-3.638) (-2.940) (-2.977) 
Log(CEO age) -0.341*** -0.362*** -0.339*** 
 
(-5.550) (-3.475) (-5.350) 
    Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 16,285 16,285 16,285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.559 0.390 0.590 
 
Panel D: CEO tenure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.374*** 0.471*** 0.379*** 
 
(3.983) (2.605) (3.987) 
Bad acquisition * Log(CEO tenure) -0.101** -0.125 -0.097** 
 
(-2.422) (-1.475) (-2.300) 
Log(CEO tenure) -0.022** 0.031* -0.031*** 
 
(-2.004) (1.719) (-2.729) 
    Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 14,189 14,189 14,189 
Adjusted R-squared 0.572 0.405 0.601 
 
Panel E: Antitakeover provisions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.322*** 0.573** 0.306*** 
 
(3.131) (2.442) (3.019) 
Bad acquisition * GIM index -0.021** -0.042* -0.018* 
 
(-2.031) (-1.664) (-1.719) 
GIM index -0.012*** -0.010 -0.013*** 
 
(-2.952) (-1.479) (-3.043) 
    Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 14,489 14,489 14,489 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544 0.391 0.575 
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Table 5: Magnitude of bad acquisition and firm risk  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of firm-year observations between 1990 and 2010. The dependent 
variable in Column (1) and (2) is the log annualized variance of daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1. The dependent variable in 
Column (3) and (4) is the log annualized variance of daily expected stock returns in fiscal year t+1. The dependent variable in Column 
(5) and (6) is the log annualized variance of daily residual stock returns in fiscal year t+1. Other variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year fixed effects and industry/firm fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for 
brevity. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
ACAR of bad acquisition -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.031*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.009*** 
 
(-11.017) (-6.048) (-10.302) (-4.166) (-11.269) (-6.366) 
Log(total assets) -0.285*** -0.203*** 0.296*** 0.309*** -0.327*** -0.252*** 
 
(-87.414) (-25.807) (46.497) (17.522) (-101.236) (-32.699) 
Log(firm age) -0.182*** -0.171*** -0.250*** -0.337*** -0.188*** -0.118*** 
 
(-23.239) (-9.290) (-16.762) (-9.431) (-24.112) (-6.607) 
M/B ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.034*** 0.019*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.221) (-0.661) (19.106) (10.923) (-3.188) (-3.211) 
Sales growth 0.027*** -0.001 0.129*** 0.047*** 0.023*** -0.001 
 
(5.775) (-0.144) (11.455) (3.784) (4.976) (-0.301) 
Return -0.047*** -0.036*** 0.267*** 0.248*** -0.060*** -0.049*** 
 
(-12.384) (-10.192) (31.517) (27.938) (-15.667) (-13.948) 
D/E ratio 0.228*** 0.214*** -0.038*** 0.012 0.245*** 0.230*** 
 
(49.182) (45.952) (-4.691) (1.196) (52.881) (48.523) 
Cash surplus -1.096*** -0.676*** -0.624*** -0.396*** -1.101*** -0.671*** 
 
(-42.619) (-25.363) (-11.672) (-5.945) (-42.565) (-25.208) 
Constant 9.400*** 9.160*** 2.407*** 3.195*** 9.562*** 9.221*** 
 
(93.644) (192.367) (14.909) (32.179) (95.128) (196.830) 
       Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583 0.749 0.302 0.463 0.629 0.775 
46 
 
 
 
Table 6: Robustness 
 
This table presents the robustness test for our baseline results. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for 
fiscal year fixed effects and industry/firm fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Stock return volatility after controlling for CEO overconfidence 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.144*** 0.079*** 0.177*** 0.115*** 0.155*** 0.086*** 
 
(6.784) (4.143) (4.508) (3.006) (7.278) (4.482) 
Confident CEO 0.048*** 0.066*** 0.187*** 0.208*** 0.032** 0.048*** 
 
(3.668) (4.843) (8.121) (7.371) (2.385) (3.577) 
       Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
Observations 24,594 24,594 24,594 24,594 24,594 24,594 
Adjusted R-squared 0.580 0.731 0.455 0.574 0.591 0.738 
 
Panel B: Stock return volatility after controlling for CEO compensation structure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Bad acquisition 0.130*** 0.075*** 0.171*** 0.129*** 0.145*** 0.084*** 
 
(5.875) (3.676) (4.205) (3.190) (6.467) (4.090) 
EquityRatio 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 
 
(14.189) (7.451) (10.678) (6.361) (12.236) (5.666) 
       Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
Observations 22,710 22,710 22,710 22,710 22,710 22,710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.731 0.460 0.584 0.596 0.743 
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Panel C: Stock return volatility after general acquisitions and good acquisitions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
Acquisition 0.001 0.030 0.009 
   
 
(0.117) (1.528) (1.208) 
   Good acquisition 
   
0.001 0.031 0.010 
    
(0.074) (1.015) (0.822) 
       Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm 
Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.749 0.463 0.775 0.749 0.463 0.775 
 
 
Panel D: Stock return volatility after all-equity financed bad acquisitions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TotRisk SysRisk IdioRisk 
All-equity bad acquisition 0.333*** 0.168*** 0.571*** 0.202*** 0.330*** 0.172*** 
 
(12.262) (6.676) (9.819) (3.733) (12.150) (6.711) 
       Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm Year/Ind Year/Firm 
Observations 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 87,518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583 0.749 0.302 0.463 0.629 0.775 
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Table 7: Bad acquisition and cash flow volatility  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of firm-year observations between 
1990 and 2010. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (3) is the standard deviation of 
quarterly earnings in fiscal year t+1. The dependent variable in Column (2) and (4) is the 
standard deviation of quarterly earnings in fiscal years t+1 to t+3. Other variable definitions are 
in the Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year fixed effects and firm fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CFVol t+1 CFVol t+1~t+3 CFVol t+1 CFVol t+1~t+3 
Bad acquisition 0.007* 0.004** 
  
 
(1.704) (2.382) 
  ACAR of bad acquisition 
  
-0.001* -0.001*** 
   
(-1.707) (-2.996) 
Log(total assets) -0.007* 0.001 -0.007* 0.001 
 
(-1.862) (0.577) (-1.874) (0.552) 
Log(firm age) 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 
 
(3.422) (4.159) (3.428) (4.171) 
M/B ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.609) (-0.306) (-0.607) (-0.302) 
Sales growth -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 
(-0.696) (0.400) (-0.701) (0.366) 
Return -0.003 -0.001*** -0.003 -0.001*** 
 
(-1.136) (-2.979) (-1.129) (-2.941) 
D/E ratio 0.010 0.002*** 0.010 0.002*** 
 
(1.141) (3.733) (1.140) (3.720) 
Cash surplus -0.051** -0.035*** -0.051** -0.035*** 
 
(-2.209) (-7.820) (-2.213) (-7.832) 
Constant -0.010 0.024*** -0.010 0.024*** 
 
(-0.221) (5.271) (-0.220) (5.295) 
     Fixed Effect Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm 
Observations 69,184 75,322 69,184 75,322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403 0.601 0.403 0.601 
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Table 8: Bad acquisition and financial/investment risk  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of firm-year observations between 1990 and 2010. The dependent 
variable in Column (1) and (2) are financial leverage in fiscal year t+1, and the average financial leverage in fiscal years t+1 to t+3, 
respectively. The dependent variable in Column (3) and (4) are asset liquidity measure in fiscal year t+1, and the average asset 
liquidity measure in fiscal years t+1 to t+3, respectively. The dependent variable in Column (5) and (6) are R&D expense/sales in 
fiscal year t+1, and the average R&D expense/sales in fiscal years t+1 to t+3, respectively. Other variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year fixed effects and firm fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bad acquisition indicator 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Levt+1 Levt+1~t+3 AssetLiqt+1  AssetLiqt+1~t+3 R&D/Salest+1 R&D/Salest+1~t+3 
Bad acquisition 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.026*** -0.018*** 1.128 0.898* 
 
(3.612) (4.001) (-7.109) (-6.138) (0.924) (1.937) 
Log(total assets) 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 0.112 -0.238 
 
(11.249) (10.511) (-8.695) (-9.583) (0.202) (-0.598) 
Log(firm age) 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -1.028 -0.116 
 
(4.446) (4.314) (-9.874) (-9.310) (-1.041) (-0.177) 
M/B ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 -0.096** 
 
(0.223) (0.422) (0.253) (0.305) (0.200) (-2.166) 
Sales growth 0.003** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -3.226*** -1.405* 
 
(2.425) (2.895) (-0.721) (-0.751) (-2.928) (-1.884) 
Return -0.001 0.000 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.119 0.286** 
 
(-0.923) (0.377) (9.876) (7.074) (0.341) (1.965) 
D/E ratio 0.045*** 0.030*** -0.021*** -0.015*** 0.016 -0.017 
 
(33.609) (24.836) (-16.649) (-11.786) (0.189) (-0.424) 
Cash surplus -0.136*** -0.102*** 0.106*** 0.075*** 2.285 -1.394 
 
(-16.770) (-13.458) (10.859) (8.322) (0.548) (-0.526) 
Constant 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.472*** 0.465*** 5.806 4.085** 
 
(4.514) (5.847) (38.792) (39.932) (1.217) (2.288) 
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       Fixed Effect Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm 
Observations 79,660 79,868 79,480 79,678 79,801 79,944 
Adjusted R-squared 0.709 0.775 0.707 0.796 0.164 0.413 
 
Panel B: Magnitude of bad acquisition  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Levt+1 Levt+1~t+3 AssetLiqt+1  AssetLiqt+1~t+3 R&D/Salest+1 R&D/Salest+1~t+3 
ACAR of bad acquisition -0.000* -0.001** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.061 -0.091** 
 
(-1.647) (-2.019) (4.807) (4.072) (-0.544) (-2.055) 
Log(total assets) 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 0.122 -0.237 
 
(20.170) (10.561) (-8.756) (-9.626) (0.221) (-0.597) 
Log(firm age) 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -1.030 -0.114 
 
(8.281) (4.307) (-9.866) (-9.304) (-1.042) (-0.175) 
M/B ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 -0.096** 
 
(0.284) (0.432) (0.233) (0.289) (0.203) (-2.163) 
Sales growth 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -3.218*** -1.407* 
 
(2.788) (2.961) (-0.768) (-0.793) (-2.923) (-1.886) 
Return -0.001 0.000 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.119 0.288** 
 
(-0.962) (0.384) (9.835) (7.042) (0.343) (1.976) 
D/E ratio 0.045*** 0.030*** -0.021*** -0.015*** 0.014 -0.019 
 
(48.567) (24.812) (-16.615) (-11.759) (0.164) (-0.461) 
Cash surplus -0.136*** -0.102*** 0.106*** 0.075*** 2.282 -1.395 
 
(-22.958) (-13.459) (10.862) (8.325) (0.547) (-0.527) 
Constant 0.052*** 0.066*** 0.472*** 0.466*** 5.774 4.083** 
 
(7.670) (5.812) (38.821) (39.945) (1.211) (2.288) 
       Fixed Effect Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm Year/Firm 
Observations 79,660 79,868 79,480 79,678 79,801 79,944 
Adjusted R-squared 0.709 0.775 0.707 0.796 0.164 0.413 
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Table 9: Bad acquisition and executive compensation  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of firm-year observations between 
1992 and 2010. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (3) is EquityRatio in fiscal year t+1. 
The dependent variable in Column (2) and (4) is EquityRatio in fiscal years t+1 to t+3. Other 
variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for fiscal year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  EquityRatiot+1 EquityRatiot+1~t+3 EquityRatiot+1 EquityRatiot+1~t+3 
Bad acquisition 0.565* 0.825*** 
  
 
(1.711) (2.637) 
  ACAR of bad 
acquisition 
  
-0.081* -0.115*** 
   
(-1.862) (-3.053) 
EquityRatio t 0.291*** 0.281*** 0.291*** 0.280*** 
 
(11.714) (11.836) (11.696) (11.814) 
Log(total assets) 0.826*** 0.887*** 0.826*** 0.887*** 
 
(15.602) (14.384) (15.521) (14.338) 
Log(firm age) -0.686*** -0.655*** -0.682*** -0.650*** 
 
(-7.213) (-5.785) (-7.160) (-5.745) 
M/B ratio 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 
 
(4.714) (5.043) (4.712) (5.041) 
Sales growth 0.529*** 0.984*** 0.514*** 0.965*** 
 
(2.879) (5.048) (2.785) (4.971) 
Return 0.027 -0.099 0.035 -0.089 
 
(0.232) (-0.980) (0.290) (-0.877) 
D/E ratio -0.182*** -0.170*** -0.181*** -0.169*** 
 
(-3.375) (-2.764) (-3.369) (-2.757) 
Cash surplus 5.189*** 6.022*** 5.185*** 6.015*** 
 
(6.727) (6.912) (6.721) (6.906) 
Constant -3.855*** -3.981*** -3.865*** -3.994*** 
 
(-8.230) (-8.410) (-8.273) (-8.461) 
     Fixed Effect Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind Year/Ind 
Observations 21,269 21,269 21,269 21,269 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217 0.262 0.217 0.262 
 
 
 
 
